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Surrounded by desert hills just thirty-nine 
kilometers east of Jerusalem, the highly 
toxic waters of the Dead Sea famously lie 
at the lowest point on the earth’s surface 
and are retreating to an ever deeper level 
each year. In 2008 the lake’s surface was 
measured at some 420 metres below sea 
level and was found to be receding at a rate 
of one meter per year.1 Part of the reason 
for this rapid shrinkage is the enormous 
chemical plants that today stand on both the 
Israeli and Jordanian-controlled shores of 
the lake, exporting the minerals they extract 
from the Dead Sea water to all corners of the 
globe for use in fertlizers, pharmaceuticals 
and beauty products.2 It is the historical 
origins of this industrial activity that are 
explored in this article – origins that can 
shed important light on the way in which 
Arab Palestinians experienced imperial 
development in the early twentieth century.
In 1930, the British Colonial Office 
signed a formal agreement with Moshe 
Novomeysky, a Jewish Russian mining 
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engineer from Siberia and committed Zionist, creating Palestine Potash Ltd (PPL). 
This company was given exclusive rights over the extraction of mineral salts from 
the Dead Sea for a period of fifty years and was the predecessor to today’s Israeli 
enterprise, the Dead Sea Works (DSW).3 Reading through Novomeysky’s memoirs, 
as well as the handful of Israeli histories of the Dead Sea industry, the concession 
appears as a hard-won Zionist victory in the face of stiff opposition within British 
parliamentary circles. From this point, the formation and subsequent success of PPL 
is described as an important early stage in the attempt to build up a national chemical 
industry in the state of Israel.4 Arab Palestinians are almost entirely invisible in this 
story, save for Novomeysky’s occasional mention of PPL’s “friendly relations” with 
Arab communities in the area.5 Focusing on the story of Ibrahim Hazboun, a Catholic 
merchant trader from Bethlehem, this article will retell the story of the Dead Sea 
concession from a local Arab perspective, employing a variety of sources, both written 
and oral, to fill in the gaps left by the colonial and Zionist archives. Contrary to the 
claims of British and Zionist officials, it will be shown that Arab Palestinians had been 
intensely interested in exploiting the riches of the Dead Sea since the end of Ottoman 
rule, and they continued to express their interest throughout the Mandate period. 
Weaving Ibrahim’s personal story into the bigger picture of national opposition to 
the Dead Sea project, it will be argued that this neglected historical episode can serve 
as a window onto the wider problems facing the Arab merchant classes during the 
transition from Ottoman to British rule in Palestine. 
Returning to Bethlehem in an age of imperial development
In 1913 Ibrahim Hazboun was living in Haiti as part of a sizeable community of 
Syrians or “Turcos” whose numbers at that time have been estimated to be as high as 
15,000.6 Born in Bethlehem in 1878, he had spent much of his childhood travelling 
the world with his father and uncle, staying for extended periods in France, Italy, the 
United States, El Salvador and Costa Rica.7 He came from one of those merchant 
Levantine families whose trading connections had become increasingly globalized 
in the late nineteenth century. With members of an extended family stationed in 
virtually every continent, regional client bases were built up over time and eventually 
incorporated into transcontinental commercial networks. The Hazbouns had long 
operated along these lines, creating a global empire of their own in the nineteenth 
century under the family business Sharikat Hazboun which specialised in the sale of 
household items, especially clothing and furniture. Sometime in the first decade of the 
twentieth century Ibrahim decided to settle in Haiti where he successfully established 
a new outpost for Sharikat Hazboun, dealing in furniture he imported from Europe, 
especially France. 
By 1913, however, Ibrahim was preparing to leave Haiti and return to the land 
of his birth. It is likely this decision was partly motivated by political circumstances 
in Haiti where a rising tide of anti-Syrian sentiment was being whipped up by the 
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country’s nationalist politicians. When the president, Cincinnatus Leconte, was killed 
along with several hundred soldiers in a bomb attack on the presidential palace in Port-
au-Prince, blame quickly fell on Syrian political groups.8 In this climate of hostility 
towards the Arab immigrant population, Ibrahim hastily prepared for departure. 
Shortly before leaving the Caribbean in 1913 he married his girlfriend Marie Luciani, 
a woman from Santo Domingo in the neighbouring Dominican Republic, and arranged 
the necessary paperwork for their journey to Bethlehem.9
Equally as important in determining Ibrahim’s return to Bethlehem was the 
attraction of economic opportunities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Like many Arab 
immigrants in the Americas (the mahjar), Ibrahim would have viewed the post-1908 
Ottoman era not as the dying days of an empire in terminal decline, but as a time of 
widened horizons for Arab participation in civic life.10 Alongside the constitutional 
reforms of 1908, the Ottoman state had long been extending its reach into the Syrian 
provinces of the Empire, laying down new routes of infrastructure in order to integrate 
this potentially lucrative region more closely with the imperial center.11 From the 
construction of a new harbour in Beirut that began in 1887 to the laying down of 
railway and telegraph lines that criss-crossed their way between the great centers of 
Syrian trade from the 1860s onwards, Ottoman modernization projects opened up 
new spaces for local merchants as contractors, developers and operators of public 
concessions. This was particularly the case during Abdülhamid II’s reign as Sultan 
(1876-1909) when a deliberate policy was implemented of favoring local merchants 
over foreigners in order to create stronger ties of loyalty among the Empire’s Arab 
subjects.12  Historians’ descriptions of this process do not normally extend into 
southern Syria (Palestine), but clearly entrepreneurs in and around towns such as 
Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem benefited from the same Ottoman practices. The spate 
of Ottoman-instigated railway building at the turn of the century included the Jaffa-
Jerusalem line (inaugurated 1892), and a new branch of the Hejaz railway that ran to 
Haifa and opened for business in 1905. These projects, and many others like them, 
involved a high degree of local participation as witnessed by the likes of Joseph 
Navon and Joseph Amzalak, the Sephardi Jewish cousins who ran the Jaffa railway, 
or the Beiruti notables, Dr Fakhouri and ʿAbdel Nour Effendi, to whom the Ottoman 
government awarded a concession in 1912 to develop the Tiberias hot springs.13
Most relevant to Ibrahim Hazboun was the increasing interest of the Ottoman state 
in the Dead Sea, both as an economic resource in its own right and as a conduit for 
trade. An early landmark in this process was the construction of a new road between 
Jerusalem and the Dead Sea, opened in 1898 to coincide with the state visit of the 
German Kaiser, Wilhelm II.14 As Eugene Rogan has documented, the road formed part 
of a wider extension of Ottoman infrastructure, aimed at opening up the eastern side 
of the Dead Sea to greater trade with Palestine. These new installations included a 
bridge over the River Jordan just north of the Dead Sea and two new roads linking Salt 
(in modern-day Jordan) to Jerusalem.15 Meanwhile, as early as 1888 Ottoman teams 
had been prospecting for asphalt at the Dead Sea and the Porte later commissioned a 
number of expeditions, both locally and internationally organized, to determine the 
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commercial viability of extracting minerals from the lake, in much the same way oil 
prospecting was simultaneously taking place in the Mosul Vilayet.16 By 1911 Sultan 
Mehmed V had issued a firman (imperial charter) for the extraction of bromine 
from the Dead Sea to three Ottoman subjects, Djindjöz Bey, Zuad Bey and Djenab 
Chehabeddin Bey – a concession that would later come back to haunt British and 
Zionist development at the Dead Sea.17 Eager to ensure the immediate commencement 
of work at the lake, Mehmed had included in the firman of 1911 the condition that 
exportation of bromine had to start within two years of the concession officially 
coming into force. By the beginning of 1915 the concession holders had failed to 
initiate production, leading the Porte to issue an irade (imperial decree) annulling the 
concession on 19 January.18 
It was against this backdrop that Ibrahim Hazboun became interested in the 
commercial value of the Dead Sea shortly after his return to Palestine in 1913. 
Situated a short distance from Bethlehem, the Dead Sea had become an important 
Ottoman military station upon the outbreak of World War I. Here the Ottomans 
profited from a pre-existing transportation business, run by Hussein al-Husseini of 
the notable Jerusalem family, whose barges had long been ferrying foodstuffs and 
other goods across the lake, especially from the grain-rich Kerak region on the eastern 
side. As the Ottoman army turned its attention to countering the Allied threat from 
Egypt, the Dead Sea trade routes came to represent a vital line of supply for troops 
stationed in Palestine, leading the Ottoman military governor in Syria, Jamal Pasha, 
to commandeer al-Husseini’s business for the war effort.19 From 1915 onwards the 
Ottoman army began to effect major change on the landscape, building a harbor on 
the western bank of the lake and then expanding the Dead Sea fleet by transporting 
several ships and barges overland from the Mediterranean, mobilizing hundreds of 
Arab sailors and laborers in the process.20 
The potential of the Dead Sea as an economic resource would therefore have been 
clearly visible to an aspiring local entrepreneur such as Ibrahim. Initially finding 
work as a tax collector for the provincial government, he quickly began to make 
enquiries regarding the possibilities of establishing a mineral extraction plant at the 
lake.21 Finding a way to gain influence in the higher echelons of Ottoman government, 
however, was no easy task and Ibrahim was certainly not alone in expressing an 
interest in such a project. Equally interested in a Dead Sea concession in this period 
was the al-Husseini family who considered themselves entitled to expand their 
commercial operations at the lake once the war ended.22 Amid this great expansion 
of activity around the Dead Sea, Ibrahim took advantage of a chance encounter with 
Jamal Pasha to press his credentials for a mineral concession. According to family 
legend, the Pasha was passing through Bethlehem en route to Jerusalem from Hebron 
when one of the wheels of his carriage broke on the bumpy road. Hearing the news, 
Ibrahim rushed to the scene, arranging for the wheel to be taken to a local mechanic 
and inviting the Pasha into his home while they waited. Grateful to Ibrahim for his 
hospitality, the Pasha listened to his plans for the Dead Sea, agreeing to meet him at 
his Jerusalem residence to discuss the matter further.23 Following this second meeting 
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Ibrahim was given a managerial role in the Ottoman transportation operations at the 
Dead Sea. According to Ibrahim’s surviving relatives, he was awarded this wartime 
position on the understanding that it would lead to a mineral concession upon the 
conclusion of the war.24  In reality, it is unclear exactly what the Pasha promised 
Ibrahim, or what his motivations were in offering him a managerial position at 
the Dead Sea. Perhaps he merely made a vague commitment in order to secure 
Ibrahim’s short-term help in running the wartime ferry service. Or perhaps he saw 
the Bethlehemite as the ideal candidate to initiate the extraction of minerals from 
the lake in the post-war period. Whatever the exact nature of Ibrahim’s agreements 
with the Ottoman authorities, his ambitions at the Dead Sea can be situated within 
the heightened interest among Arab merchant classes in profiting from imperial 
development in Palestine during this period. The Hazboun family was representative 
of this wider trend. Between the years 1910 and 1925, dozens of members of the 
extended family returned from life in the diaspora to set up new businesses in 
Palestine.25 They invested heavily in property in Bethlehem and Jerusalem, as well as 
around Jaffa and Beit Dajan where they bought several orange groves from which they 
exported the “Hazboun” brand of Jaffa oranges to Europe in the 1920s and 30s.26 
While historians have typically viewed this inbound Arab migration to Palestine as 
a result of the advent of British rule and the new economic opportunities it presented, 
it is clear that the process was already in motion by the time the Mandate began. 
Stories such as that of Ibrahim Hazboun demonstrate that there is no clear dividing 
line between the British and Ottoman periods as far as Arab migration is concerned, 
and the early twentieth century needs to be viewed more generally as an era of great 
change and modernization in Palestine. French historians such as André Raymond 
and Robert Ilbert have long described a process by which cities across the Eastern 
Mediterranean were integrated into the world economy in the nineteenth century 
through a subtle interplay between autonomous local actors and the integrating drive 
of the imperial state.27 By the beginning of the twentieth century it is clear this “jeu 
subtil”28 between Ottoman planners, local merchants and European financiers was also 
playing out in Palestinian cities such as Jaffa, Jerusalem and Haifa, and that merchant 
migrants such as Ibrahim Hazboun were returning to claim their share of the profits.29
British rule and the end of Arab opportunity at the Dead Sea
The coming of British rule initially seemed to continue and even accelerate these 
processes as a wide range of migrants descended upon Palestine in search of new 
opportunities. At the Dead Sea it quickly became apparent that the new British regime 
was equally intent upon exploiting the lake’s commercial possibilities. Once general 
Allenby’s troops gained control of the lake in the winter of 1918 a research team was 
quickly dispatched to survey the area. Led by the Canadian geologist Major Brock, the 
expedition reported favourably on the potential for “a large and profitable industry” 
at the Dead Sea.30  In particular Brock’s report focused on the large deposits of potash 
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Transporting grain from the Dead Sea, Matson collection, Library of Congress.
Unloading grain on the north shore, Matson collection, Library of Congress.
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(potassium chloride) found in the lake’s waters – a mineral increasingly used in the 
production of agricultural fertilizers. Up to this point Britain had been dependent on 
Germany for its supplies of potash, meaning the prospect of extracting the mineral 
from the Dead Sea was extremely appealing to imperial enthusiasts such as Brock: 
“to the Empire as a whole a successful industry of this kind would be invaluable, for 
it would not only ensure a permanent supply of cheap potash, essential for agriculture 
and other industries, but make us independent of any foreign source.”31 As government 
departments in Whitehall began to formulate their plans, it seemed as if there might be 
a place for Ibrahim Hazboun at the Dead Sea. The government’s immediate priority 
in the aftermath of World War I was to continue using the lake as a supply line that 
could ease the problem of food shortages. For this reason Ibrahim was urged by the 
government’s chief administrator to continue running ferries across the lake, importing 
cereals into Palestine from the Kerak region. Ibrahim now found himself operating 
a commercial transport business, propped up by the new British regime which sold 
him two of the military’s motor boats stationed at Jaffa for 6,000 Egyptian pounds 
(LE) and leased him a plot of land at the north-western end of the lake, near today’s 
settlement of Kalia.32
But for Hazboun and many Arab entrepreneurs like him, British rule quickly 
proved to be a disappointment. The plurality of the “Ottoman Commonwealth”33 was 
fast disappearing in Palestine as the government in London set about reshaping the 
region along ethno-national lines. Britain’s decision to facilitate the establishment 
of a “Jewish national home” in Palestine had far-reaching consequences for the old 
Arab merchant classes who now found themselves squeezed out of their former role 
as the operators of public works concessions and government development projects. 
Underlying Britain’s Zionist policy was the deep-seated belief that European Jews 
were better suited to play the role of Palestine’s merchant middlemen, acting as the 
catalyst for a new era of development and industrialization in the “Middle East”. This 
approach was outlined in the terms of the Mandate itself, as agreed at the League of 
Nations in 1922: “The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned 
in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair, and equitable terms, any public works, 
services and utilities.”34 In contrast, no mention was made of the thousands of Arab 
businessmen, many of them returning from the mahjar, who sought to profit from 
imperial development schemes. 
As the 1920s wore on, it became increasingly difficult for the old Arab merchant 
classes to secure government contracts. The Beiruti merchants, mentioned above, who 
had secured the Tiberias hot springs concession from the Ottoman government in 1912 
found this out the hard way. Initially the British mandatory government extended their 
concession, but when a Jewish company expressed an interest in the springs in 1925, 
the government’s chief secretary cut short the original concession.35 In 1932 a Zionist 
enterprise, the Tiberias Hot Springs, opened to the public, symbolizing the shifting 
balance of forces south of the British-French mandatory border.36 It was this same 
ordering of labour along preconceived notions of “ethnic suitability,” prevalent all 
over European colonial empires, that Ibrahim encountered once he began to push the 
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British administration for a Dead Sea mineral concession. In all his correspondence 
with the British government, as well as in the recollections of his surviving relatives, 
Ibrahim stressed he was running the motor boat business purely as a stepping stone 
to achieve his larger goal of “a concession for the extraction of salt and potash from 
the Dead Sea” (imtiyāz istikhrāj al-milḥ wa-l-būtās min al-baḥr al-miyyet).37 But in 
London plans were already underway to award a concession to Moshe Novomeysky 
who had begun to express his interest in the Dead Sea after moving to Palestine 
in 1920.38 Initially the Jerusalem government did everything in its power to keep 
Ibrahim’s transport business afloat, eager to deter other potential developers from 
establishing a presence at the Dead Sea. By 1920, however, a reduction in wheat 
traffic between Transjordan and Palestine had left Ibrahim struggling to meet the 
repayments on loans he had been encouraged to take out with the Anglo-Egyptian 
Bank to purchase the government’s boats. According to Ibrahim’s attorney, the 
government director of commerce and industry, Mr Harari, promised Ibrahim 
during this period that he would be granted a salts concession as soon as the British 
Mandate was formally ratified by international treaty.39 In consultation with the high 
commissioner, Harari also arranged for the Anglo-Egyptian Bank to loan Ibrahim a 
further LE 3,500 backed by a government guarantee. Ibrahim therefore continued his 
work at the lake, paying a further LE 5,600 to the government for equipment needed to 
keep the business running.40
In the meantime, Novomeysky set about trying to purchase Ibrahim’s business as “a 
way to establish myself legally on the Dead Sea” and in the summer of 1921 Ibrahim 
began receiving instructions from the Jerusalem government to accept the Russian’s 
advances. 41  Eager to clear his rising debts, Hazboun signed an initial agreement 
with Novomeysky on 12 July, by which he would be paid a fee of LE 1,600 and have 
his debts to the Anglo-Egyptian Bank transferred to Novomeysky. The agreement 
also stipulated Ibrahim would continue his involvement at the Dead Sea, assuming a 
managerial position in the transport company with a monthly salary of LE 80.42 
But from Ibrahim’s perspective the matter was far from settled as Novomeysky 
delayed on the initial payment of LE 1,600 and subsequently sought to lower the 
overall price of purchase. By April 1923 Novomeysky had reduced his offer to LE 
11,500, of which only LE 1,500 would be paid in cash with the remaining sum to be 
paid in shares which were, according to Ibrahim, no longer worth the value assigned 
to them by Novomeysky.43 In reality, Novomeysky was an evasive figure during this 
period, spending most of his time in Europe, seemingly content to let the matter drag 
on in the hope that Ibrahim would be declared bankrupt. According to Ibrahim’s 
attorney, Novomeysky twice took action against him for bankruptcy in 1923, both 
times unsuccessfully, while at the same time avoiding Ibrahim’s repeated requests to 
conclude a final agreement.44 Nowhere are these claims contradicted in the records 
of the Mandate government, nor were they denied by Novomeysky, whose memoirs 
mention the affair only very briefly, describing an agreeable transaction that resulted 
in “three satisfied parties” – the government, Hazboun and Novomeysky.45 
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For Ibrahim, however, the reality was highly unsatisfactory. As the Anglo-Egyptian 
Bank applied increasing pressure in 1924 and 1925 for the repayment of his debts, 
the administration in Jerusalem reneged on its verbal promises of protection. In the 
summer of 1924, an Arab construction company based in Jerusalem, Kattan and Sons, 
intervened on Ibrahim’s behalf, offering to repay his debts in exchange for the right 
to extract salts from the Dead Sea. Despite the enthusiasm of the attorney general in 
Palestine for this offer, a telegram from the colonial secretary in London instructed 
the Jerusalem government to reject the Kattan approach on the grounds that it would 
“involve alienation of ground which might be of importance to a chemical enterprise 
on the Dead Sea”.46
Facing an increasingly desperate financial struggle, Ibrahim obtained several 
interviews with the assistant governor of Jerusalem in which he attempted to garner 
government support with his loan repayments.47 Upon the failure of these efforts, 
he requested the dispute be referred to a board of arbitration. When this was in turn 
rejected, his attorney announced he was suing the government for LE 16,000 of 
damages incurred since he was first sold the boats by the government in 1917.48 
Ibrahim’s debtors were closing in, however, and on 19 October 1925, the Anglo-
Egyptian Bank informed the chief secretary in Jerusalem it was “taking steps to 
liquidate the assets of Hazboun existing at the Dead Sea,” and asked the government 
if it had any objections to such actions.49 This is the last mention of Ibrahim Hazboun 
to be found in government records. His relatives, meanwhile, recount the story of his 
subsequent journey to Europe where he attempted to have his case heard at the High 
Court in London and the Permanent Court of International Justice in The Hague.50  
Both attempts ended in failure and it must be assumed his property at the Dead Sea 
was liquidated, allowing Novomeysky to acquire the lease of Dead Sea land, along 
with the transport business, at his reduced offer.51 Little is known of Ibrahim’s plight 
over the next ten years or so, but it is clear that by the late 1930s he had regrouped his 
finances sufficiently to be able to rent a plot of land near the Jewish settlement of Kfar 
Etzion, a short distance to the southwest of Bethlehem, where he cultivated a vineyard. 
But his dreams of achieving entrepreneurial success in Palestine had evaporated and 
he made a modest living from this point on, producing wine and arak from the grapes 
he grew.52
Contesting the Dead Sea at a national level:  
the struggle for Dead Sea “treasure”
The Palestine government’s cynical treatment of Ibrahim Hazboun is indicative of the 
wider British disinterest in giving Arab enterprise a lead role in colonial development 
projects in Palestine. In his correspondence with the Palestine government, Ibrahim 
continually framed his transport business within the longer-term project of extracting 
salts from the Dead Sea. He also outlined plans for a number of other commercial 
schemes, employing the same language of development so often found in British 
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Falastin front page cartoon, 2 Nov., 1932.
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colonial correspondence: namely the importance of utilizing modern science to 
render the natural world more productive. His plans included an agricultural scheme 
to develop 60,000 dunams of land in the plains between Kerak and Amman: “I am 
prepared to introduce modern agricultural machinery…and cultivate a great part of 
the said land which shall yield plentifully”.53 He belonged to that merchant class 
of Palestinian Arabs who had foreseen great economic opportunity under British 
rule, only to find that it was European Jews who had been earmarked as Palestine’s 
international tradesmen and operators of public works concessions. The company that 
attempted to save Ibrahim from bankruptcy in 1924, Kattan and Sons, was another 
Bethlehem family business with trading connections all over Europe and the Americas. 
But there was no place for these merchants in Britain’s Dead Sea plans which were 
being formulated far away in the corridors of Whitehall where Zionists were better 
placed to prove their scientific and economic worth.54 
Despite much opposition in both Palestine and the British Parliament, Novomeysky 
was finally awarded the Dead Sea concession in 1930 and PPL began production in 
1932.55 The Dead Sea industry would prove to be an important asset for both British 
imperial goals and the Zionist national economy. As far as Britain was concerned, 
the company played a crucial role in breaking the old reliance on German supplies 
of potash. This was most vividly demonstrated during World War II when the 
government was able to redirect Dead Sea exports to British Empire countries. By 
1944 over half of Britain’s potash and 75 per cent of its bromine (PPL’s other major 
product) was being drawn from the Dead Sea.56 Elsewhere in the Empire, PPL’s share 
of the potash market leapt from 10.75 per cent in 1939 to 80 per cent in 1944.57 For the 
Zionist movement, meanwhile, PPL was an important step towards the creation of a 
national Jewish industrial economy in Palestine. By the time Chaim Weizmann came 
to write his autobiography in 1949, he considered the Dead Sea project as one of the 
key Zionist achievements of the interwar years: “Nahalal, Deganiah, the University, 
the Rutenberg electrical works, the Dead Sea Concession, meant much more to me…
than all the promises of great governments or great political parties.”58 
During the Mandate period, British officials and politicians frequently explained 
their preference for Zionist enterprise by claiming that Arab Palestinians had little 
interest in initiating such projects. As Winston Churchill famously informed the 
House of Commons in 1921, the Arabs of Palestine “would have been quite content 
to dwell – a handful of philosophic people – in the wasted sun-scorched plains, letting 
the waters of the Jordan continue to flow unbridled and unharnessed into the Dead 
Sea.”59 The story of Ibrahim Hazboun, and others like him, stands as an important 
corrective to this colonial narrative that is still so central to the Israeli national story 
today. Indeed Ibrahim was not the only Arab Palestinian to repeatedly request a Dead 
Sea concession. When speculation was growing in 1927 over Zionist involvement 
in the concession Jamal al-Husseini, relative of Hussein al-Husseini and one of the 
leading political figures in Palestine, wrote to the high commissioner in Jerusalem and 
the colonial secretary in London. He claimed that the first applicant for the concession 
had been a member of his family and the former mayor of Jerusalem, Musa Kazim al-
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Husseini, who had applied to the government of Transjordan in 1923. The letter went 
on to state: 
Since the year 1923, the Palestine Arab Executive Committee, representing 
the majority of the inhabitants of Palestine, have repeatedly, verbally and 
in writing, made it clear to the authorities concerned that the inhabitants 
whom they represent have the urgent desire that the Dead Sea undertaking 
and all other such undertakings that involve the natural wealth of the country 
should be nationalized…under such conditions fit to gain the endorsement 
and support of the inhabitants who are the natural owners of that wealth.60
Jamal al-Husseini was most likely unaware that Novomeysky had been in secret 
negotiations with the Colonial Office since 1920, but Musa al-Husseini’s application 
for a concession in 1923 is nonetheless highly plausible given his family had profited 
so greatly during the late Ottoman period from the transport business they operated 
across the Dead Sea. A reading of the Palestinian Arabic press from the same period 
suggests this desire to participate in development at the Dead Sea was widely shared 
among the Arab political classes. Dozens of newspaper articles denounced the British 
decision to award the concession to Novomeysky as a “robbery” (sariqa) and “stolen 
treasure” (kanz masrūq). Some of these articles highlighted PPL’s confiscation of 
land and resources used by the local Arab communities to make way for the new 
industrial sites. In February 1937, for example, the Jerusalem-based daily, al-Liwa’, 
drew attention to the loss of Bedouin land in the Beersheba district, reporting that the 
secretary of the Arab National Council in Beersheba, Rashid Aska, had made a speech 
denouncing PPL’s dispossession of the Azlam tribe from its land.61 Meanwhile in 1940 
al-Iqdam drew attention to the ongoing dispute over access to water at Ghor al-Safi 
on the Transjordanian side of the Dead Sea. Under an agreement signed the previous 
year, PPL was authorized to derive water from the Umm al-Hashim channel, provided 
the farmers of Ghor al-Safi were left with adequate supplies for their agriculture. 
According to al-Iqdam, “the water of the channel is not sufficient anymore for the 
requirements of the farmers,” leading them to lodge a complaint with the Land 
Department in Amman.62
Most of the articles, however, viewed the Dead Sea through the wider lens of 
national struggle against the British-Zionist presence. Newspapers such as al-Difa‘ 
declared the “Robbery of sixty thousand dunams of land by a Jewish company”,63 
while the Jaffa-based paper Falastin ran numerous articles on the Dead Sea, 
constantly framing the issue within an anti-imperialist discourse. When the fifteenth 
anniversary of the Balfour Declaration came around in November 1932, for example, 
Falastin included the Dead Sea project in its front-page cartoon depicting “Balfour 
and the woes inflicted on Palestine by his fateful declaration” (balfūr wa-ma jarahu 
waʿdhu al-mashʾūm min al-waīlāt ʿala filasṭīn).64 This cartoon, reproduced on 
p.34, caricatured on a map of Palestine the ten greatest “woes” (waīlāt) caused by 
Britain’s support for Zionism, including the “Rutenberg electricity project” (top 
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left), the “Jewish factories of Haifa” (bottom left) and a colonial official representing 
“the British king and emperor of India who watches over this tragedy” (middle 
left). Clearly marked at number six in the top right-hand corner of the map was the 
Dead Sea project which, as stated in the explanation beneath, was “run by Tulloch 
[Novomeysky’s partner] and the Jewish Novomeysky who have taken the concession 
for the extraction of salt and minerals and the treasures contained within them!” This 
front-page feature demonstrates the increasingly central position being assigned to 
natural resources in Palestinian national politics in this period. As another newspaper, 
the Haifa-based journal al-Nafir, summed up in 1930: “Palestine is at present a poor 
country. The Dead Sea salts give her the potentiality of being one of the richest 
countries. But these riches are not yet in her own hands.”65
The toxic waters of the Dead Sea in the age of national conflict
What is striking about British government records is the extent to which these 
protestations fell on deaf ears. Government officials were aware of Arab protests 
over the Dead Sea development, but they chose to ignore them.66 Indeed there is not 
a single instance in which any Arab involvement in the management of the Dead Sea 
development is contemplated by a government official. As the protests of political 
leaders such as Jamal al-Husseini demonstrate, this was not due to a lack of interest 
from the Arab community in running the concession. Rather it reflected the closure 
of an era in which a merchant class of Jews, Arabs and Europeans could all compete 
for the spoils of imperial development in the Eastern Mediterranean. The more rigid 
divisions of national politics were beginning to take shape in Palestine, supported by a 
British government that explicitly sought to award public works concessions to Zionist 
enterprises. 
Inside PPL itself, these same divisions quickly took shape during the 1930s. 
Unlike many other Jewish industries in Palestine, Novomeysky employed unskilled 
Arab labourers at the two PPL plants. This proved to be a source of great irritation 
to the Jewish trade union federation in Palestine, the Histadrut, but it also gave PPL 
access to a large pool of cheap, local labour.67  These were the manual workers who 
numbered around 300 during peak seasonal demands for casual labour, making up 
around half of the total PPL workforce at that time.68 They were drawn largely from 
the towns and villages surrounding the Dead Sea, especially Jericho in the north and 
the Transjordanian village of al-Safia at the southern plant. 
In contrast to the idyllic image of Jewish-Arab co-existence presented in 
Novomeysky’s memoirs, life as an Arab employee of PPL was fraught with tension 
and hardship.69 The Dead Sea industrial plants were organised along the principle 
of segregation. In this system the Arab labourers were segregated from their Jewish 
colleagues and discriminated against on every level. They lived in a separate “camp” 
in units which were smaller and of lower quality than the Jewish accommodation. 
These were described in a company report as “primitively timbered huts,” consisting 
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of “wooden planks which have been covered with tin sheets from petrol tins.”70 
The systemic separation was reinforced through diet with Arab laborers fed “meals 
prepared in the oriental fashion in a separate kitchen.”71 Meanwhile Arab wages were 
consistently around half of those received by Jewish manual laborers and Arabs were 
excluded from the company’s recreational and educational activities as these were 
all in Hebrew.72 When protesting the disparity in wages at the Dead Sea in December 
1930, the Arabic newspaper Mi’rat al-Sharq, posed the question: “to whom can the 
Arab laborer complain?”73 Until 1947, the answer was nobody. In his study of labor 
relations in Mandate Palestine, Zachary Lockman explains in a footnote how, after 
years of resisting any attempts to organize PPL’s Arab workforce, the Histadrut 
eventually recruited them in 1944 in an effort to pre-empt its rival, the Palestine Arab 
Workers’ Society (PAWS). But when PPL responded by firing some of those Arab 
workers who enrolled, the Histadrut found itself in a paradoxical position. Rather than 
contradicting its wider goal of “Hebrew labor,” the Histadrut withdrew its support 
for the fired workers, and it was not until 1947 that Arab trade unions organized any 
representation for the Arab employees of PPL, just one year before the company’s 
termination.74 For the vast majority of PPL’s existence, therefore, Arab workers had 
no trade union support at the Dead Sea, ensuring their wages and working conditions 
remained well below those of Jewish workers.
Given the working conditions of the Arab labour force, the potential for unrest 
was considerable. This was reflected in the heavy security measures taken by PPL 
to protect its Jewish workers, particularly at the more isolated southern plant.75 A 
sense of danger is evoked in the PPL correspondence whenever the Arab workforce 
is mentioned and, despite Novomeysky’s claims to the contrary, Arab employees at 
PPL supported and aided the rebel bands operating in the area during the rebellion of 
1936 to 1939. In January 1939 the Jewish workers at the southern plant wrote a highly 
concerned letter to Novomeysky, stating that “the Arab workers…speak frankly of 
their sympathy with the bands,” going on to give evidence of their support to local 
rebels. The letter also listed a series of potentially disastrous scenarios, including the 
possibility of Arabs poisoning the local spring water and an attack on the isolated 
factory at the southern works: “The Arabs working in the factory would, in such a 
moment, certainly be a serious danger from inside.”76
In this atmosphere of fear and suspicion, PPL’s geographic position in the east of 
Palestine near the Transjordanian border was a cause of great concern for its Jewish 
management as the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 approached. In a memo written to the 
UN in 1947, Novomeysky beseeched the General Assembly to consider altering the 
boundaries of its proposed partition of Palestine so that the PPL headquarters at Kalia 
on the northern shore of the Dead Sea would be included in the proposed Jewish state. 
Given that the General Assembly was due to vote on the partition plan just one month 
later, Novomeysky wrote with great urgency, stressing the superior ability of Jews to 
run such a technical operation: “It is feared that a newly constituted Arab state, with 
a primitive economy, whose political objectives would not necessarily be the full 
development of the country’s resources, might hamper and restrict the Company’s 
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operations to the damage of the interests of Palestine as a whole.”77
But in the new Middle East that was emerging from the wreckage of the British 
Mandate, Zionist industrialists like Novomeysky could no longer rely on Britain 
to enforce their role as agents of development. When full-scale war broke out in 
May 1948, PPL’s northern plant found itself on the wrong side of the new border 
dividing the Israeli and Jordanian armies. In April the mandatory government had 
ceased providing armed escorts to the PPL convoys travelling the Jerusalem-Jericho 
road as British troops and policemen began to be evacuated from Palestine. Now 
exposed to attack on all sides, Novomeysky frantically attempted to use his good 
relations with King ʿAbdullah to negotiate the creation of a neutral zone around the 
Dead Sea. However, his efforts were in vain and on 19 and 20 May Kalia and the 
neighbouring kibbutzim were evacuated by a special fleet of small boats commanded 
by the Palmach (the elite Zionist military unit), under the orders of David Ben-Gurion. 
As a parting shot the fleeing Jewish population made sure to sabotage the factory’s 
equipment, rendering useless to any future Arab enterprise.78 When the Arab Legion 
arrived at the site on 22 May they found a deserted wasteland, already vandalized by 
the local Arab population, that would barely have resembled Novomeysky’s prized 
“oasis of civilized life.”79
The Dead Sea was now cartographically dissected, with the southern half under 
Israeli control and the northern half inside the state of Jordan, leaving no space for a 
shared Jewish-Arab story of post-colonial development. The lake would be re-divided 
several times in the following decades, but the British dream that Jews would lead a 
pan-Middle Eastern march towards industrial modernity lay in ruins among the rubble 
of the PPL buildings at Kalia. 
Many other dreams also lay in ruins as the result of Britain’s refusal to entertain 
Arab participation in its development projects. Among the thousands of Palestinians, 
both Jewish and Arab, who lost their lives in the conflict of 1948 and 1949 was 
Ibrahim Hazboun, killed sometime between May and July 1948, along with his sister 
and two nephews in the fighting that enveloped the area around Kfar Etzion.80 Ibrahim 
had returned to Bethlehem from Haiti in 1913 a relatively wealthy man, anticipating 
a new age of economic opportunity in Palestine. By the end of the British Mandate 
his dreams of entrepreneurial success were a distant memory as he eked out a modest 
living cultivating his vineyard. The exact circumstances of his death remain shrouded 
in mystery. It is possible he had joined the Arab Legion’s attack on the nearby kibbutz 
which resulted in the death of Arab as well as Jewish fighters, and ended with the 
infamous events of 13 May 1948, when between 120 and 160 Jews were massacred.81 
Or perhaps he was merely caught in the crossfire of that brutal war, trying to protect 
the little property he had left. Ibrahim was survived by a single daughter, Olga 
ʿAbdrabbu, whom he had raised alone after the death of his wife, Marie Luciani, in 
1932. Members of the Hazboun family living today in Bethlehem and the United 
States tell the story of how Olga tried for many years after 1948 to gain ownership 
of Ibrahim’s old boats at the Dead Sea from the Israeli authorities, but all to no 
avail.82 To all intents and purposes, traces of her father’s business at the Dead Sea had 
[ 40 ]  Toxic Waters: Ibrahim Hazboun and the Struggle for a Dead Sea Concession, 1913-1948
disappeared from the Israeli records, save for a handful of the letters he wrote to the 
Mandate government in the 1920s now buried among the files of the State Archives in 
Jerusalem – an awkward footnote in a new story of Jewish national development at the 
Dead Sea. 
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